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Introduction
All too often, businesses defend themselves against a myriad of law-
suits without taking advantage of the coverage provided by their Com-
prehensive General Liability Insurance (CGL) policies, for which they
pay continually increasing premiums. The complex transactions and in-
tricate factual situations common in today's litigation may lead some risk
managers to conclude that a particular claim is not covered by a CGL
policy. Insurers perpetuate such a conclusion by denying that they have
a duty to defend or to indemnify insureds. The unfortunate result is that
businesses may be paying twice for certain liabilities. This article dis-
cusses a trend in California law whereby insureds have been successful in
obtaining coverage under the "advertising injury" clause found in many
CGL policies.' By focusing on advertising injury coverage (as opposed
to traditional property loss or personal injury coverages), insureds have
been able to obtain coverage for claims involving antitrust, patent in-
fringement, unfair competition, piracy, and various intentional torts in-
cluding misrepresentation. 2
A few caveats should be mentioned. First, although this article de-
scribes coverage under the advertising injury clause, the other insuring
clauses of the policy should not be ignored when analyzing coverage
under a given policy.' Second, this article focuses on the insurer's duty
to defend rather than the specific duty to indemnify the insured for the
claimed loss.4
I
Canons of Policy Interpretation
Although an insurance policy is a contract, there are several unique
canons or guiding principles by which these contracts are to be inter-
preted. The California Supreme Court addressed one such canon, the
"reasonable expectation of the insured," in the seminal case of Gray v.
Zurich Insurance Co.5 In Gray, the court had to determine whether an
1. See generally, William J. Robinson, Insurance Coverage of Intellectual Property Law-
suits, 17 AIPLA Q. J. 122 (1989).
2. See, e.g., id.
3. The most common forms of coverage under the CGL policy are for property damage
and bodily injury. One should always evaluate these portions of the policy in addition to the
advertising injury clause to determine whether coverage is available.
4. Most of the cases interpreting the advertising injury clause have focused on the insur-
ers' duty to defend. Since the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, the analy-
sis needed to obtain indemnification will usually be a subset of the duty to defend analysis. See
CNA Casualty of Cal. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 278 (Ct. App. 1986) ("The
duty to defend is much broader than the duty to indemnify.").
5. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966).
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insurance company could avoid its duty to defend a claim that its in-
sured, Dr. Vernon Gray, intentionally assaulted the underlying claimant.
The insurer argued that intentional conduct was excluded by the policy
so that its duty to defend was not triggered.6 The court, noting that the
exclusionary clause at issue was not clear or conspicuously stated in the
policy, held that Dr. Gray had a reasonable expectation of coverage that
triggered the insurer's duty to defend.7 The court added that an insurer's
duty to defend will be triggered if the underlying claim "potentially seeks
damages within the coverage of the policy," and that the insurer must
look to the underlying complaint as well as other information to deter-
mine if its policy affords coverage for a given claim.8
The California Court of Appeals extended the Gray analysis to ad-
vertising injury in CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. 9 In
CNA, the insurers denied coverage for an antitrust claim brought against
Western States Bank Association. The court, recognizing that the under-
lying complaint alleged facts that could give rise to coverage under the
advertising injury clause, held:
[T]he duty to defend is so broad that as long as the complaint contains
language creating the potential of liability under an insurance policy,
the insurer must defend an action against its insured even though it has
independent knowledge of facts not in the pleadings that establish that
the claim is not covered.10
Thus, the insurer's duty to defend does not turn on whether the
insured would ultimately be liable for a covered loss. Rather, the duty to
defend arises if there is merely a potential (based on the facts found in the
complaint or available from any other source) that an insured may be
liable for a covered loss. 1 Moreover, an insurer cannot complacently
6. Id. at 169-70.
7. Id. at 170. In so holding, the court established the well accepted rule that any policy
exclusion must be clearly and conspicuously stated and should be found in the policy near the
coverage language. Id.; see also Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 329 (Ct. App.
1980) (holding that the exclusion in a motorcycle liability insurance policy was not sufficiently
conspicuous, clear, and plain and had to be interpreted in the insured's favor).
8. Gray, 419 P.2d at 176 (emphasis in original). The court reasoned that since modern
pleadings are "malleable, changeable and amendable," an insurer must look beyond the plead-
ings to determine whether the underlying facts present any potential for coverage. Id.
9. 222 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1986).
10. Id. at 279 (emphasis in original). The court ultimately found that even though the
underlying complaint specifically alleged claims for antitrust and intentional interference with
contractual and business relationships, it also contained facts that could give rise to claims for
"unfair competition," "piracy," and "idea misappropriation." Since the insurers had not de-
fined these terms in the policy, the terms were construed against them. Id. at 280-81.
11. Id.
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evaluate a claim by relying on the complaint alone. The insurer must
thoroughly evaluate a claim before deciding to deny coverage.12
Beyond attempting to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the
insured, courts also consider the following canons of policy
interpretation.
1. The insurance policy must be viewed and construed in its entirety
"with each clause lending meaning to the other." 13
2. The words in an insurance policy must be construed in their ordi-
nary sense and an ambiguity "cannot be based on a strained interpreta-
tion of the policy language."''
4
3. Doubts regarding the meaning of the insurance contract must be
resolved in favor of the insured.'
4. Whether a policy provision is ambiguous is a question of law.' 6
5. A policy provision is ambiguous when it can be construed in two
or more reasonable ways.' 7
6. A policy exclusion must be construed strictly against the insurer
and liberally in favor of the insured. 18 Similarly, where a strict literal
interpretation of a policy clause would unreasonably restrict coverage,
it cannot be imposed on the insured.' 9
Courts adopted these canons of construction because insurance con-
tracts are viewed as contracts of adhesion. The insurer offers coverage
under a pre-printed form that typically allows little, if any, negotiation
between the parties. As an adhesion contract, therefore, an insurance
policy must be interpreted to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the
insured.2°
II
Coverage for Advertising Injury
A. Pre-1986 ISO Clause
The most commonly used advertising injury provision has normally
been inserted into a policy as a "broad form endorsement." Before 1986,
12. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 456-57 (Cal. 1979) (insurer must
completely evaluate the possible bases that might support an insured's claim, including con-
ducting its own independent evaluation).
13. Delgado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting
Holz Rubber Co., Inc. v. Am. Star Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Cal. 1975)).
14. Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 925 (Cal. 1986) (quot-
ing McKee v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 745, 746 (Ct. App. 1983)); see also
Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 328-29 (Ct. App. 1980).
15. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966); Producers Dairy, 718 P.2d at
924.
16. Producers Dairy, 718 P.2d at 925.
17. Id.
18. Miller, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29 (citing Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d
1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971)).
19. Id. (citing Schilk v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 60, 64 (Ct. App. 1969)).
20. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966).
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the broad form endorsement of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) de-
fined advertising injury as follows:
Advertising injury means injury arising out of an offense committed
during the policy period occurring in the course of the named insured's
advertising activities, if such injury arises out of libel, slander, defama-
tion, violation of right of privacy, piracy, unfair competition, or in-
fringement of copyright, title or slogan. 2f
This definition identifies several bases for an insurance claim. Most nota-
bly, courts have recently imposed a duty to defend upon insurers for
claims involving intellectual property and related disputes by adopting a
broad definition of "unfair competition."
1. The Demonet Decision
In Demonet Industries v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,22 Demonet
Industries (Demonet) alleged that Transamerica Insurance Co. (Trans-
america) breached the terms of an insurance policy and the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing when it refused to defend Demonet in
a lawsuit involving Demonet's sale and management of a commercial of-
fice building in San Jose.2 3 In that action the plaintiff alleged that
Demonet discouraged potential tenants from renting in a building that
Demonet had sold to the plaintiff but continued to manage, breached its
contractual and fiduciary obligations under the sales contract and man-
agement agreement, and committed fraud and interfered with the plain-
tiff's prospective economic advantage.24
Demonet's insurance policy with Transamerica adopted the ISO
broad form endorsement for advertising injury, which includes coverage
for unfair competition. 25 Demonet based its tender, as well as its later
lawsuit against Transamerica, partly on the theory that the endorse-
ment's inclusion of "unfair competition" obligated Transamerica to ac-
21. CGL Reporter at II-350B (App. Supp. Spring 1991) (ISO policy form GL 04 05 81).
While this article focuses on the definition of advertising injury, the broad form endorsement
contains additional elements that must be satisfied to obtain coverage. The advertising injury
must arise "out of the named insured's business" and be within the "policy territory." Id. The
definitions of these terms can usually be found in the policy but are not included in the broad
form endorsement.
Though the ISO changed the language of its advertising injury clause in 1986, this version
is still the most popular and certainly the most frequently litigated version of the clause.
22. 278 Cal. Rptr. 178 (Ct. App.), review granted, 810 P.2d 997 (Cal. 1991). Since the
California Supreme Court recently granted review of Demonet, the Court of Appeals' decision
cannot be cited as precedent in California. CAL. R. OF CT. 976(d), 977(a) (1991). Neverthe-
less, a review of Demonet is instructive to analyze the rationale being applied to the definition
of "unfair competition."
23. Demonet Indu&, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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cept its tender of defense in the underlying lawsuit. The superior court
disagreed and granted Transamerica's demurrer.26
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Transamerica's "duty to
defend [Demonet] was in fact triggered by language in the [underlying
lawsuit] that raised at least the potential for coverage under the provision
in the Endorsement relating to advertising injury; specifically, that cover-
ing 'injury arising out of... unfair competition .. '. ."I"
In reaching this result, the court rejected Transamerica's contention
that the endorsement's reference to "unfair competition" referred only to
the common law tort of passing off the goods of a business rival as one's
own. The court noted that California Business & Professions Code sec-
tion 17200 defined "unfair competition" much more broadly to include
"unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice[s] and unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading advertising."28 Moreover, in interpreting that stat-
ute, the California courts had rejected the common law view that unfair
competition claims could only be brought by a competitor. 29 The court
concluded that "unfair competition" should be given as broad a meaning
in the context of its use in liability insurance policies as it has been given
in the statutory context.3 0 The court ultimately held that plaintiff's claim
for interference with prospective economic advantage was covered by the
unfair competition language of the policy. 3'
The court also rejected Transamerica's argument that it had no duty
to defend because the alleged torts did not occur in the course of
Demonet's "advertising activities." Under California law, the court
ruled, even "one-on-one oral representations" could constitute
advertising.3 2
2. The Bank of the West Decision
Another Court of Appeal panel reached a similar result in Bank of
the West v. Superior Court.33 Bank of the West sued its insurer, Indus-
26. Id. at 181.
27. Id. at 182. As mentioned above, an insurer's duty to defend will be triggered if there
is a potential for coverage.
28. Id. (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1991)).
29. Id. at 183.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 183-84. The court also adopted the rationale of CNA Casualty of California v.
Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1986), noting that an insurer's duty to defend
does not depend on how a complaint is actually styled but rather on whether any facts derived
from any source give rise to potential liability that would be covered under the policy.
Demonet, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 183 n.3.
32. Demonet, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
33. 277 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Ct. App.), review granted, 807 P.2d 1006 (Cal. 1991). Bank of the
West was originally decided on November 15, 1990, and published at 275 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Ct.
[Vol. 14:389
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trial Indemnity Company (Industrial), using California Business & Pro-
fessions Code section 17200, for coverage in connection with an unfair
competition action arising from the bank's advertising. Industrial had
adopted the ISO broad form endorsement and defined "advertising in-
jury" as injury occurring in the course of the "insured's advertising activ-
ities, if such injury arises out of libel, slander, defamation, violation of the
right of privacy, unfair competition, or infringement of copyright, title or
slogan."34
The court held that the endorsement entitled the bank to coverage
because it included unfair competition claims within its scope.35 It re-
jected Industrial's contention that the endorsement's use of "unfair com-
petition" was limited to the narrow common law tort of palming off (also
known as passing off) goods. The court reasoned that the phrase was
susceptible to at least two meanings: one referring to common law tort,
the other referring to the broader statutory definition of unfair competi-
tion which includes "unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertis-
ing. '  The court also noted that a third meaning for the phrase might
also be found by resorting to its dictionary definition." Because the
phrase was susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, the
court concluded that the phrase was inherently ambiguous and, as such,
"the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer in favor of providing
coverage for the insured."38
Industrial contended that the policy's reference to "unfair competi-
tion" was not ambiguous if read in context with the rest of the policy and
that instead the phrase clearly referred merely to the common law tort.
Industrial argued that because the phrase appeared in the policy in a list
with eight common law torts, it too should be interpreted as referring to
the common law tort of unfair competition. This argument failed, the
court concluded, because it rested on an erroneous premise: "[M]any of
those torts have also been codified by statutes and cannot be considered
as merely common law torts anymore."3 9
App. 1990). On December 17, 1990, the court granted rehearing. On January 4, 1991, the
court vacated its earlier opinion and rendered a virtually identical opinion, which was pub-
lished at 226 Cal. App. 3d 835. As in Demonet, however, the California Supreme Court has
granted review. As a result the case may not be cited as valid California precedent. See supra
note 22.
34. Bank of the West, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (emphasis omitted). Industrial's definition of
"advertising injuiry" excludes "piracy" but is identical to the ISO form in all other respects.
35. Id. at 224-30.
36. Id. at 224 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (1990)).
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, 768 (Cal. 1982) and Poland v.
Martin, 761 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1985)).
39. Id. at 225.
19921
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The court also rejected Industrial's other contextual arguments,
finding that:
(a) the court was not bound merely by the words in the contract itself
because all the statutory and decisional law defining a term becomes a
part of the contract by legal inference; 4°
(b) the statutory definition of unfair competition did not subsume the
other torts mentioned in the clause and thus render them meaningless
because even "a cursory look" at the definitions "convinces us that all
those torts continue to retain ample independent meaning even if a
broader statutory definition ... is adopted";
4 1
(c) Industrial's argument that the statutory definition could not have
been intended because the statute did not permit damages was flawed
because "a damage award under section 17200, et seq., [could not] be
categorically excluded" due to the uncertain state of California prece-
dent on the issue;
42
(d) what Industrial considered to be a relatively low premium did not
suggest narrow coverage because the amount paid ($6,700) was
"hardly an insignificant sum" and in any event merely indicated that
the bank had "shopped around" to get the lowest premium it could
obtain;43
(e) that courts in other jurisdictions had interpreted "unfair competi-
tion" in similar insurance contracts to refer only to the common law
tort was immaterial because "[tihose cases apply either the New York
or Washington law which do not define unfair competition in the same
terms as section 17200 does;" 44 and
(f) other parts of the insurance policy exclude coverage for "palming
off," which would render the policy's coverage for unfair competition
40. Id.
41. Id. at 225-26.
42. Id. at 226, 228-29.
43. Id. at 226.
44. Id. Unlike the recent trend in California, courts interpreting New York and Washing-
ton law have adopted a narrower definition of "unfair competition." See Globe Indem. Co. v.
First Am. State Bank, 720 F. Supp. 853, 855-57 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (Under Washington law,
the definition of "unfair competition" in general liability policy endorsement did not cover
alleged misrepresentations in course of bank's advertising.), affid, 904 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1990);
Pine Top Ins. Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 676 F. Supp. 212, 215-17 (E.D. Wash. 1987)
(alternate holding) (Under Washington law, coverage for unfair competition claims in adver-
tising injury clause did not extend coverage for claims in securities action alleging defendants
were responsible for various misrepresentations and omissions in various official statements
and prospectuses.); Ruder & Finn Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 422 N.E.2d 518, 523 (N.Y. 1981)
(Under New York law, advertising injury clause providing coverage for unfair competition did
not give rise to a duty to defend a state court action alleging infliction of intentional harm,
where "the defendants were not competitors of [plaintiff in the state action], did not work for
competitors of [plaintiff] and were not attempting to appropriate to themselves any profit,
property or advantage belonging to [plaintiffl."); cf Boggs v. Whitaker, Lipp & Helea, Inc.,
784 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (Even if the unfair competition clause in the
insurance contract were as broad as the state unfair competition statute, the clause would not
provide coverage in a state securities action because the statute only applies to acts against
competitors and there were no allegations or evidence that the insureds' actions had harmed a
competitor.), review denied, 791 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1990).
[Vol. 14:389
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"not only symbolic, but virtually nonexistent" if the common law defi-
nition applied.45
The court also disagreed with Industrial's contention that the insur-
ance policy's language should not be strictly construed against it because
"the Bank was not an unsophisticated insured and had equal bargaining
power with Industrial." '46 The court reasoned that whatever merits the
argument might have on other facts, it did not apply because "[t]he pol-
icy was not negotiated between the parties and the Bank had no hand in
drafting it. The . . . policy and the extended coverage endorsement
thereto were standard industry forms which were sold to the Bank on a
take it or leave it basis."47
Last, the court rejected Industrial's contention that the policy did
not provide coverage because the alleged acts of unfair competition did
not occur in the insured's advertising activities. As in Demonet, the
court held that "advertising" is "not limited to paid announcements in
print and broadcast media," but can also include "one-on-one oral repre-
sentations."48 Both in that broad sense and also by printed advertise-
ments, the court concluded "the Bank did engage in advertising... and
that the advertising injury (i.e., unfair competition) occurred during such
advertising."'49
3. The Keating Decision
Like the California state courts, federal courts in California have
also adopted a broad interpretation of unfair competition. In Keating v.
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,5" the court considered
whether Charles Keating and his colleagues from American Continental
Corporation fame were covered under a CGL policy against allegations
that they had fraudulently sold corporate bonds through Lincoln Savings
and Loan. Keating argued that since the CGL policy issued by the Na-
tional Union Insurance Company (National Union) covered "unfair
competition", it would have to cover claims involving unfair or fraudu-
lent business practices as well as unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading
advertising.51 While the court recognized that palming off was a reason-
able definition of "unfair competition," it ruled that a "broader definition
45. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr. 219, 226 (Ct. App. r991).
46. Id. at 227.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 229 (citing Nichols v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 416 (Ct. App. 1985);
Feather River Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Sillas, 158 Cal. Rptr. 26 (Ct. App. 1979)).
49. Bank of the West, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
50. 754 F. Supp. 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
51. Id. at 1435. National Union argued that "unfair competition," as used in the policy,
meant only the traditional common law tort of palming off. Id.
1992]
of the term is also reasonable." 52 Because "unfair competition" is now
used as a generic name for several different torts involving the improper
interference with business prospects, the court held that Keating's char-
acterization of the term as including unlawful or unfair business practices
as well as unlawful, untrue, or deceptive advertising was also reason-
able."3 The court found the term "unfair competition" was ambiguous
and must be construed against National Union,54 and concluded that Na-
tional Union had a duty to defend Keating and his colleagues from the
underlying complaint."
4. Related Decisions
The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia has also issued unreported decisions that further illustrate the trend
toward finding coverage for insureds under the advertising injury
clause.56 For example, in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Watercloud
52. Id. at 1436.
53. Id. at 1437.
54. Id. The court cited the California Supreme Court's decision in Producers Dairy De-
livery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1986), for the proposition that a policy provi-
sion is ambiguous if it is capable of two or more reasonable definitions. Keating, 754 F. Supp at
1435.
55. Keating, 754 F. Supp. at 1441.
56. Judges in the Northern District of California have not shared the view of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals and their colleagues in the Central District. See Tigera Group, Inc. v.
Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 858, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (Vukasin, J.) (Granting
summary judgment for insurer, holding insurer had no duty to defend misrepresentation claim
under advertising injury clause providing coverage for "unfair competition." "There is no
indication that the purpose of consumer protection language in California Business and Profes-
sions Code section 17200 was to overrule the common law definition of 'unfair competition' as
that phrase is used in insurance policies."); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dynasty Solar, Inc.,
753 F. Supp. 853, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (Conti, J.) (Granting partial summary judgment for
insurer, holding that under advertising injury clause providing coverage for "unfair competi-
tion" claims, insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify class action claims for alleged fraudu-
lent and unfair sales practices; when read in context, "the only reasonable interpretation of
unfair competition which emerges ... is the common law definition .. "); Westfield Ins. Co.
v. TWT, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 492, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (Legge, J.) (Denying summary judgment
for insured, holding that "advertising injury" clause that provided coverage for "unfair compe-
tition" did not cover claims in connection with defendants' alleged mishandling of financial
matters for savings and loan association. "Courts have retained the more restrictive common
law meaning of unfair competition in the interpretation of insurance policies, even when the
term in a state statute has been interpreted more expansively."); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Trans World Assurance Co., 745 F. Supp. 1524, 1529 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (Peckham, J.) (dic-
tum) (Although the court finds persuasive the arguments against interpreting "unfair competi-
tion" as expansively as it is defined in the California unfair competition statute, summary
judgment granted because the claims against insured did not include a claim brought under
that statute, but rather asserted claims in fraud, RICO, estoppel, and contract.).
This obvious split in authority has apparently motivated the California Supreme Court to
address the issue since, as mentioned above, it has granted review for both Demonet and Bank
of the West.
HASTINGS Comm/ENT L.J. [Vol. 14:389
Bed Co., Inc.,5" the court considered whether an insured was covered
under the advertising injury clause for a patent infringement claim. The
insurers, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna) and Industrial
Indemnity Company (Industrial), argued that the insured, Watercloud
Bed Company (Watercloud), was not covered against a patent infringe-
ment claim because the underlying claim did not involve any "advertis-
ing activity" by Watercloud and because patent infringement was not
covered under the definition of "advertising injury.""8 The court con-
cluded that section 271(a) of the Patent Code can involve advertising
activities. Further, since the underlying complaint alleged that Water-
cloud offered to sell allegedly infringing products, the advertising activity
requirement was satisfied.59
Aetna and Industrial also argued that the patent infringement claim
against Watercloud did not involve advertising injury. But the court
held that patent infringement claims may be both "unfair competition"
and "piracy" as those terms are commonly defined.'
Similarly, the court in Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. United National
Insurance Co.6 ruled that a patent infringement claim is covered under
the ISO broad form endorsement as both unfair competition and
piracy.62 In granting summary judgment to the Intex Plastics Sales
Company (Intex), the court expressly found that the terms "unfair com-
petition," "advertising activity," and "piracy" were not defined in the
endorsement and were to be construed in favor of the insured. The court
further held that patent infringement is an unfair business practice that is
57. No. SA CV 88-200 AHS (RWRx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1988). For a copy of this
decision, see Robinson, supra note 1, at 153 (appendix).
58. One of the prerequisites of coverage under the definition of advertising injury in the
ISO broad form endorsement is that the alleged injury must occur "in the course of the named
insured's advertising activities" CGL Reporter, supra note 21, at II-350B (emphasis added).
While the endorsement does not define "advertising activity," the Bank of the West court
declared that the term means to" 'advise, announce, apprise, command, give notice of, inform,
make known, publish,' or to 'call to the public attention by any means whatsoever.' " Bank of
the West v. Superior Ct., 277 Cal. Rptr. 219, 229 (Ct. App.) (emphasis in original) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 50 (5th ed. 1979)), review granted, 807 P.2d 1006 (Cal. 1991).
59. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 163. The court reached an opposite conclusion in
Nat'l. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Siliconix Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(ruling that even though a patent infringement claim was included in the definition of
"piracy," it did not involve advertising activity).
60. Robinson, supra note 1, at 166-68.
61. No. CV 90-2050 CBM (Kx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1990). For a copy of this decision see
David A. Gauntlett, Recent Developments in Insurance Coverage of Intellectual Property Law-
suits, 3 J. OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 2, 12-15 (Feb. 1991) (appendix).
62. Gauntlett, supra note 61, at 15 (appendix).
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anticompetitive and legally prohibited. As a result, the insurers had to
defend Intex.63
5. Policy Exclusions
The broad form endorsement contains a number of exclusions
designed to preclude coverage for advertising injury. Perhaps the most
notable excludes coverage for advertising injury arising out of "infringe-
ment of trademark, service mark or trade name, other than titles or slo-
gans, by use thereof on or in connection with goods, products or services
sold, offered for sale or advertised."" As mentioned, policy exclusions
must be clear, unambiguous, and conspicuous. 65 Moreover, exclusions
will be interpreted strictly against the insurer.66 These rules may have
particular importance to businesses seeking insurance coverage for trade-
mark infringement claims.
Arguably, the trademark exclusion in the ISO broad form endorse-
ment is ambiguous and should be construed against the insurer. The
policy provides coverage for, among other things, piracy, unfair competi-
tion, and infringement of title. Each of these items covers trademark
infringement claims. 67 Thus, to provide coverage and then exclude that
same coverage creates the type of ambiguity that the Gray court
denounced.68
63. Id. at 13-14 (appendix). Similarly, Judge Gray of the Central District ruled that ex-
cess insurers who were potentially liable for trademark infringement had a duty to defend the
insured under the advertising injury clause. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Centennial Ins.
Co., 838 F.2d. *346, 349 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. CGL Reporter, supra note 21, at II-350B.
65. See supra Part II.
66. Id.
67. Even if "unfair competition" had not been broadly defined by the Demonet, Bank of
the West, and Keating cases, trademark infringement would be included in the term. See Int'l
Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980) (trademark
infringement is a species of unfair competition), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). Similarly,
piracy "may be interpreted to include such offenses as ... trademark infringement." Nat'l.
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Siliconix Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
Finally infringement of title, though not defined in the broad form endorsement, arguably
covers trademark infringement. A "title" may be a "mark, style, or designation," "the name
by which anything is known" that "may become a subject of property ... as one who has
adopted a particular title for a ... business enterprise, may, by long and prior usage, ...
acquire a right to be protected in the exclusive use of it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485
(6th ed. 1990). Under this definition, a claim for infringement of title is tantamount to a claim
for infringement of trademark.
68. See, e.g., Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1044-45 (7th
Cir. 1987) (policy held ambiguous and construed in insured's favor where it provided coverage
for libel and tortious interference with contract but excluded coverage for intentional acts);
Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. First S. Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Court
determined that an insurer cannot provide coverage for certain advertising activities and then
exclude coverage for those same activities.); Seals v. Morris, 423 So. 2d 652, 656 (La. Ct. App.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.. [Vol. 14:389
More significantly, the trademark exclusion itself is internally am-
biguous. The exclusion purports to exclude claims for infringement of
"trademark, service mark or trade name," but then excepts claims for
infringement of "titles or slogans, by use thereof on or in connection with
goods, products or services sold ... ."69 Since infringement of title may
well include trademark infringement, the exclusion excepts at least some
trademark claims from its scope. At the very least, the exclusion is un-
clear and ambiguous.7° Arguably, therefore, the exclusion should be
construed against the insurer.
The broad form endorsement contains other exclusions. Risk man-
agers must carefully evaluate each exclusion to see if they apply in any
given case.7'
B. 1986 ISO Clause
The ISO changed its approach to advertising injury coverage in
1986. Rather than using an endorsement format, the ISO incorporated
advertising injury coverage into the main body of the policy. The policy
form still required that the advertising injury occur in the "coverage ter-
ritory" in the course of an insured's efforts to advertise his goods, prod-
ucts or services. 72 However, this ISO dramatically changed the definition
of "advertising injury." Among other things, the ISO defined "advertis-
ing injury" as, "[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business; or... [i]nfringement of copyright title or slogan."' 73 The policy
does not mention "unfair competition" or "piracy." Nor does it define
"style of doing business" or infringement of title.74 Moreover, the trade-
mark infringement exclusion is conspicuously absent from the 1986 form.
Despite the semantic changes in the 1986 ISO form, many of the
potential claims that could give rise to coverage in the form of unfair
competition may also be covered under the misappropriation of style of
doing business clause. According to a legal dictionary, "misappropria-
tion" means "the taking and use of another's property for [the] sole pur-
pose of capitalizing unfairly on the good will and reputation of property
1982) ("coverage can not be provided by the right hand and then be excluded by the left
hand").
69. CGL Reporter, supra note 21, at II-350B.
70. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 174-76 (Cal. 1966).
7 1. Each policy exclusion should be measured against the canons of policy interpretation
discussed above. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
72. CGL Reporter, supra note 21, at II-1011 (ISO policy form CG 00 02 02 86).
73. Id. at II-1010.
74. Only one reported opinion has mentioned the "misappropriation of style of doing
business" language, but that case did not attempt to define the phrase. John Deere Ins. Co. v.
Shamrock Indus., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 434, 437 (D. Minn. 1988).
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owner."75 "Style," in its noun form, can mean "[a] form of words,
phrase, or formula, by which a particular idea or thought is expressed,"76
or "[a]ny distinguishing or qualifying title, appellation, or denomina-
tion."77 "Business," among other things, means "[tirade, commercial
transactions or engagements." '78 Thus, a reasonable definition of "misap-
propriation of style of doing business" may be "the taking of another's
title, appellation or denomination used to conduct trade or commercial
transactions for the sole purpose of capitalizing on the good will and
reputation of the owner."
Arguably, misappropriation of one's style of doing business may
cover trademark, service mark, or trade name claims. It could also cover
claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and interference with con-
tractual relationships. Similarly, infringement of title arguably covers
trademark, service mark and trade name infringement claims as well as
claims for patent infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets.79
While these theories have not been judicially tested, they present
reasonable definitions for undefined phrases. There may be other reason-
able definitions as well. If so, the phrases "misappropriation of style of
doing business" and "infringement of title" would be deemed ambiguous
and construed in favor of the insured. 8° In any event, if an insured can
show that it faces an actually or potentially covered claim it should be
able to require the insurer to defend the claim.
III
Conclusion
Advertising injury clauses have been used with increasing success as
a way for insureds to obtain defense costs for a variety of claims. A
company that sells and advertises products should always evaluate
whether claims brought against it are covered under the advertising in-
jury clause. Specifically, claims involving interference with contractual
relations, misrepresentation, unfair competition (in its broadest sense),
patent infringement, trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade
secrets, and infringement of title all may be covered under the CGL pol-
icy. Risk managers, recognizing that the canons of policy interpretation
primarily favor the insured, should take the initiative to make sure their
companies receive all the insurance protection to which they are entitled.
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (6th ed. 1990).
76. 16 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1009 (2d ed. 1989).
77. Id.
78. 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 696 (2d ed. 1989).
79. See supra note 67.
80. Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 924 (Cal. 1986).
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